Practical privacy-aware opportunistic networking by Parris, Iain & Henderson, Tristan
Practical privacy-aware opportunistic networking
Iain Parris
School of Computer Science
University of St Andrews
St Andrews, Fife, KY16 9SX, UK
ip@cs.st-andrews.ac.uk
Tristan Henderson
School of Computer Science
University of St Andrews
St Andrews, Fife, KY16 9SX, UK
tristan@cs.st-andrews.ac.uk
Opportunistic networks have been the study of much research — in particular on making end-to-end routing efficient.
Users’ privacy concerns, however, have not been the subject of much research. What privacy concerns might opportunistic
network users have? Is it possible to build opportunistic networks that can mitigate users’ privacy concerns while
maintaining routing performance?
Our work-to-date has tackled the problem of creating privacy-preserving routing protocols, with less emphasis on
discovering users’ actual privacy concerns. We summarise our current results, and describe a future experiment that
we have planned to better understand users’ privacy concerns.
opportunistic networking, privacy, social networks, routing protocols
1. INTRODUCTION
People commonly carry mobile devices — such as
phones — during their daily lives. When in proximity,
these devices may exchange data directly, without using
any traditional infrastructure, via a protocol such as
Bluetooth. If many such devices cooperate with one
another, an opportunistic network may be formed (Pelusi
et al. 2006). Data are exchanged between mobile devices
opportunistically as they move into physical proximity, in
a disconnected store-and-forward architecture.
There are a number of challenges in opportunistic
networking research. One challenge is routing. Given
episodic connectivity, based on people’s real-world
movements, how might we efficiently route messages
through the network? If we naı¨vely exchange messages
during each and every encounter, flooding messages out
along all possible paths, then the message will certainly
find and follow any existing path — indeed, the shortest
path — between sender and destination to be delivered as
quickly as possible.1 But this epidemic routing approach is
costly: large numbers of redundant messages are typically
sent, which may rapidly drain the batteries of the mobile
devices. Therefore, various routing schemes have been
proposed that utilise social network information to inform
routing decisions. (Hui et al. 2008; Daly and Haahr 2009;
Boldrini et al. 2008).
A second, related challenge is privacy. Through partic-
ipating in an opportunistic network — and especially
1Under ideal conditions. If storage space is finite, for example, then
nodes may run out of storage space and drop messages, and thus this
may not be the case.
if social network information is used to inform routing
decisions — users may experience a variety of privacy
threats (Parris and Henderson 2011b).
Our research focuses on the intersection of these
challenges. What privacy concerns might opportunistic
network users have? How might we measure these
concerns for future application users, given the disconnect
between what people say and what people do with
respect to privacy? Is it possible to build opportunistic
networks which can mitigate users’ privacy concerns
while maintaining routing performance?
The proposed PhD thesis statement is: it is possible to
maintain opportunistic network performance after adding
the privacy-preserving features that users desire.
Our work-to-date has tackled the problem of creating
privacy-preserving protocols. We have performed simula-
tions with real users’ data — location traces, and location-
privacy preferences — to quantify the impact of privacy
preferences on performance.
Our focus is now on a problem up-the-stack: the user.
We wish to perform an HCI experiment, utilising a new
methodology, to measure the privacy concerns of users
for an example future opportunistic network application.
Ultimately, the goal is to improve the happiness of users,
through securing their potentially-sensitive data — which
we note ties in with the HCI 2011 Health, wealth &
happiness theme. We hope to receive useful feedback and
suggestions at the HCI 2011 Doctoral Consortium.
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Figure 1: Location-sharing preferences of Facebook users.
Those experiencing simulated publishing of their data share
their data more openly than those experiencing real publishing:
they less often disclose their location to no-one, and more often
to everyone.
2. CURRENT RESULTS
So far, we have found three main results:
1. Users behave differently when participating in a real
system, compared to a simulated system.
2. Users’ location-privacy preferences may signifi-
cantly impact opportunistic-network performance.
3. Significant obfuscation of social-network informa-
tion is possible, while still maintaining good social-
network routing performance.
We describe each in turn.
2.1. User study: location-privacy preferences
We performed a user study, investigating the location-
sharing privacy preferences of 80 users of the popular
online social network Facebook.2
Participants carried a location-sensing mobile phone for
one week of their daily lives. Due to resource constraints
— we had 20 mobile phones available, but 80 participants
— we performed the user study in four one-week runs,
each with 20 participants. Two of the runs were conducted
in a small UK town, St Andrews; the other two runs were
conducted in a large UK city, London.
Utilising the experience sampling method (Consolvo and
Walker 2003), participants were prompted up to 20 times
each day to choose how widely they would be happy for
their current location to be shared on Facebook — to
everyone, to some or all of their Facebook social contacts,
or to no-one.
At the start of each of the four runs, the 20 participants
in the run were randomly divided into two groups.
The real group experienced real publishing of their
location information on Facebook; the simulation group
2http://www.facebook.com/
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Figure 2: Delivery ratio (i.e., proportion of unique messages
that are delivered) for epidemic and social-network routing,
under three different privacy modes. The delivery ratio falls
significantly when privacy concerns are taken into account (the
Friendly (F) and PubPriv (PP) privacy modes).
experienced simulated publishing, where information was
never disclosed to anybody, regardless of user preferences.
We investigated whether publishing information “for real”
(the real group) resulted in a difference of behaviour
compared to simulated publishing. Figure 1 shows our
main result: the simulation group shared their locations
more openly than the real group (Parris et al. 2010).3
2.2. Performance impact of users’ location privacy
preferences
Inspired by Westin (2003), we built a privacy model for
location sharing from the study described in Section 2.1.
We performed simulations utilising this privacy model, in
three different modes:
• Default (D): Privacy preferences ignored.
• Friendly (F): Privacy mode, where nodes may share
to everyone, to no-one, or to their social contacts.
• PubPriv (PP): Stronger privacy mode, where nodes
share only with either everyone or no-one.
Figure 2 demonstrates our main finding. We found (Parris
and Henderson 2011a) that users’ location-privacy pref-
erences may significantly impact opportunistic network
routing performance. Indeed, under the stronger PubPriv
mode, the median delivery performance was zero.
2.3. Performance evaluation for protocols preserving
social graph privacy
We target the threat of leakage of social-graph information
by obfuscating the sender’s social network at the time of
3Note that Parris et al. (2010) describes only the first two runs, since the
experiment was ongoing at the time of publication.
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Figure 3: Delivery ratio after various degrees of obfuscation
of social-network information. It is possible to maintain good
performance (90% that of unmodified routing) after significant
(−40%) obfuscation of the social network information.
message generation. Through simulation, we evaluate the
performance of these new privacy-enhanced protocols.
Figure 3 demonstrates our main finding. It is possible to
significantly obfuscate the social network information, by
removing up to 40% of the sender’s “friends list” (social
graph neighbours) from each message at generation time,
while still maintaining good routing performance — a
message delivery proportion (delivery ratio) of 90% that
of unmodified social network routing). Further details are
available in Parris and Henderson (2011b).
3. FUTURE WORK
We are planning an HCI experiment to probe the question
of how privacy concerns may impact the willingness
of users to participate in a future opportunistic network
application. Our current results (Section 2.1) suggest that
users behave differently in real and simulated systems, and
thus we are planning a deceptive user study, where we
simulate an opportunistic application, but do not inform
participants that it is a simulated application. We intend
to use the experiment results to inform interpretation
of our current routing performance results (described in
Sections 2.2 and 2.3).
3.1. Experiment plan
The opportunistic network application that we intend to
simulate is a proposed, distributed, privacy-aware mobile
advertising system, MobiAd (Haddadi et al. 2010). In
such a real system, advertisements are distributed to
mobile devices opportunistically, as are anonymous “click
reports” describing interaction with the advertisements.
The users, therefore, would dedicate some of their
device’s resources to the network — for example,
accepting a certain reduction in battery life, due to the
extra energy used when transmitting messages.
By simulating this application, and presenting the
experimental participants with various examples of
potentially-sensitive information that may be leaked
through its use, we wish to investigate differing degrees
of willingness to participate in the network, as measured
by the quantity of phone resources that participants would
be willing to dedicate to the application.
We hypothesise that, as we increase the amount of
sensitive information displayed, users will become less
willing to participate in the network — and, therefore,
will allocate less resources to the application. This is a
non-trivial hypothesis: perhaps the increased transparency
of the application increases user confidence, and thus
increases the willingness to participate in the network? We
thus search for the amount of information “leakage” that
results in maximal participation in the network.
In our proposed experiment, we will create an Android ap-
plication, installed on mobile phones given to experiment
participants for one week. This application will prompt
participants for a username, on the first run. It will display
(fake) adverts on the phone’s home screen at all times, by
using Android’s capability to detect the user’s location,
and then scraping web services for nearby businesses to
“advertise” to the user.
There will additionally be an option on the home screen
to display extra information about other participants. This
information will be simulated for each participant, but
the participants will not know this: this is the deception
mentioned earlier, in order to mitigate the difference of
behaviour of users of real vs simulated applications. The
intention is that each participant will become aware that
their own information may be leaked to other participants,
by analogy to the information that they believe they can
see about the others (“if I can see this information about
them, then they must be able to see this information about
me too”).
The simulated information displayed to the participants
will differ across groups, to which participants will
randomly be assigned at the start of the experiment. We
intend to examine the effects of leakage of two types of
potentially-sensitive information, at differing resolutions:
location and social graph. We therefore propose dividing
the participants into five groups:
1. Control: No sensitive information displayed.
2. Location-Street: Simulated locations of users
displayed, at the street-level.
3. Location-City: Simulated locations of users dis-
played, at the city-level.
4. Social-Neighbours: Simulated list of participants
frequently encountered by this particular user.
5. Social-All: Simulated list of all participants, with
the option to click through to see their (simulated)
lists of frequently-encountered participants.
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The phones will prompt each participant once per day to
answer a question, along with providing an explicit view
of the simulated information (so that this information is
salient, if the user chooses not to review it during the
day). The question will be to ask the participant to use
a slider (initially unset) to choose a maximum amount
of battery life (in hours) that they would be prepared to
devote to the opportunistic network application in the next
24 hours. We reason that this question would be easy
for participants to understand, and quick to answer. The
application would, however, not really use their phone’s
resources based on the previous question answers, so as to
avoid draining the device’s battery and possibly hindering
the experiment: we reason that even without real usage
of the battery, we would obtain a measure of the user’s
willingness to participate in the network at various times.
We are interested only in relative differences between
groups, rather than absolute values.
As mentioned earlier, the experiment results would
inform interpretation of our previous performance results,
which evaluate performance for protocols under varying
assumptions of user behaviour. Example questions that
we hope to answer are: (i) Which privacy mode from our
location simulation is more realistic? (ii) Are participants
concerned about social graph privacy?
3.2. Problems and questions
Some open questions, which we hope to discuss during
the HCI 2011 Doctoral Consortium, include:
• How precisely could we best display potentially-
large numbers of simulated encounters (i.e., social
graph information) or location information to the
relevant participants, on the small phone screens?
• Should participants interact to differing degrees
with the visualisations of potentially-sensitive
information, then what are the implications for
interpretation of the results?
• How could the potentially-noisy results best be
interpreted?
• How many participants should take part in the
experiment? And how should they be selected?
• If participants’ willingness to participate in the
network varies in different contexts (e.g., perhaps
there are particular times when they do not wish
to give up any battery life), then is it possible to
improve on the coarse slider-based questions?
4. CONCLUSION
We have summarised our current results, and detailed our
planned user study. We hope that these results and plan
may be of interest to HCI 2011 Doctoral Consortium
participants, and in turn we hope to receive useful
feedback and suggestions.
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